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ADAPTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TO THE
ECOLOGISTS' DISCOVERY OF DISEQUILIBRIA
WILLIAM

H.

RODGERS, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

Professor Judy Meyer's splendid paper en the "new ecclogy"'
shows how thoroughly concepts of equilibria have been discarded by
scientists who study the physical world and its inhabitants. It is my job
to show how this revolution in thinking has undermined a legal superstructure that was built on a reality now exposed as nine parts myth.
The ideas in the paper are derived chiefly from a recent study by the
National Research Council on the conservation land acquisition practices of four federal agencies-the Bureau of Land Management, the
Forest Service, the Fish & Wildlife Service, and the National Park
2
Service.
I.

ASSESSING THE LEGAL DAMAGE

Professor Meyer's presentation can be recast as an indictment of
contemporary conservation law, calling for a reassessment of five bedrock practices and doctrines held dear by lawyers and lawmakers: (1)
the methodology of comprehensive rationality; (2) the idea of the fee
simple absolute; (3) the practices of condemnation; (4) the "ark" theories of land conservation; and (5) the parcel-by-parcel approach to
acquisitions.
A.

Wrong Model #1: Comprehensive Rationality

Frequently, theories of comprehensive rationality presume that
the authorities can identify all pertinent policy options, calculate with
some reliability the costs and benefits associated with each one, and
set up a top-to-bottom list of options ranging from best to worst. In
an ideal world, then, all the policymaker must do is to read from the
top of the list. This methodology of comprehensive rationality has
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many implications and they are played out in environmental law in
arenas ranging from forest policy planning to Superfund cleanups to
NEPA analyses. Three difficulties deserve mention in the present
context. First, Professor Meyer shows how presumptuous it is to believe that we can peer into this indeterminate future and discover durable answers that are worthy of our reliance. Second is the familiar
problem that any policy comparison game requires inventions of numerical rankings associated with various outcomes; the numbers invariably hide the policy preferences behind them. In the land
acquisition business as practiced by the federal government, higher
numbers mean higher rankings, and the way to get higher numbers is
to assign a few more uses to the acquisition parcel. 3 Thus, a property
that offers protection for an endangered species earns a mere "40" but
if room can be found for motorcyclists too the value of the parcel
jumps to "75.''4 Third, apart from these problems of valuation, this
comparison compulsion puts all properties with enormously disparate
values into a single free-for-all competition with one another. The
Academy confronted this homogenization tendency by recommending
a disentanglement of acquisitions into discrete categories under major
headings such as outdoor recreation, natural resources protection, and
5
cultural resources protection.
B.

Wrong Model #2: The Fee Simple Absolute

Why government agencies generally prefer to buy the "whole
thing" in the form of a fee interest is an interesting story with multiple
explanations. 6 But an acceptable general account is that land managers believe that their goals can be achieved more easily if they can
exercise the strong authority of a fee owner over properties whose
uses they seek to influence. What Professor Meyer demonstrates,
however, is that management goals that embrace protection of species
and perpetuation of ecosystems rarely can succeed by exercising the
sovereign rights of a fee simple owner over scattered parcels and even
over broader territories once thought sufficient to sustain most management contingencies. When one factors finite resources into the
equation, which is highly recommended these days, the conservation
strategy of limited but decisive fee purchases is exposed in all its
weaknesses. In an effort to extend the restricted reach represented by
3. See id.at ch. 8 (discussing OMB land acquisition priority procedure).
4. See id. at 238 app. B.

5. Id.at 9.
6. Id. at ch. 7.
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a strategy of fee simple purchase, the Academy study recommends
that the agencies resort to the whole range of acquisition, retention,
and exchange techniques. 7 Implicit in this choice is the expectation
that management objectives often can be realized short of the fee
owner's iron hand of control.
C.

Wrong Model #3: Condemnation

The strong assumption of the fee in conservation land acquisition
practice is reinforced by the power of condemnation, which is everywhere in the law of parks and wildlife management. 8 The deep history of government acquisition of properties gives a hint of why the
twin principles of compulsion and ouster of the resident population
were deemed indispensable. The operation of bombing ranges, highways, and reservoirs leaves no room for unwilling sellers and stubborn
holdouts. And the governments that undertake these projects have
assumed ownership of vast tracts of land and moved millions of people out of the way.9 It is the condemnation authority that makes these
ambitious endeavors possible.
More surprising is why the condemnation model is extended so
readily to the acquisition of lands for park and wildlife refuge purposes where the conflict between management goals and a resident
human population is not nearly so evident. Yet, experience shows
that this highway condemnation model has been enthusiastically applied to land conservation endeavors not only in the United States but
all over the world. For the most part, parks are established with the
same rigorous intolerance for inholders as are highways. In its ugliest
iteration, residents are ousted from the new park, moved to hostile
lands in the environs, and asked to behave charitably towards the enterprise that has made their lives miserable.
The extent of compatibility between resident inholder and conservation goals is a subtle subject that cannot be explored fully here.
It is sufficient to say that recognition of Homo sapiens as part of the
landscape is an indelible aspect of working reality in even the most
fragile of wilderness lands. 10 Frequently, conservation goals can be
7. See id. at 10.
8. See id. at 60-61 (explaining that the Secretary of Interior is given eminent domain powers under 41 separate statutes).
9. See, e.g., Charles C. Geisler, Adapting Social Impact Assessment to Protected Area Development, in THE SOCIAL CHALLENGE OF BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION (Shelton H. Davis

ed.) (Global Envtl. Facility Working Paper No. 1, 1993).
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achieved by dealing with willing sellers of essential lands and tolerating the continued presence of unwilling sellers. This recognition
counsels abandonment of the authority to oust in all but the most
emergent circumstances. The Academy study recognizes that people
are there to stay by counseling a more enthusiastic resort to social
impact assessment techniques in the course of acquisition strategies.1
Undoubtedly, the privilege of remaining in the preserve will be accompanied by relinquishment of some of the hard edges of fee simple
entitlement.
D.

Wrong Model #4: The "Ark" Configuration

Many of the world's conservation lands have been set aside on
the assumption that management in isolation will allow protection in
perpetuity of the protected resources. For the reasons elaborated by
Professor Meyer, this convenient belief has been thoroughly shattered
by empirical reality: the reserve is never big enough, its boundaries
12
are not impermeable, its conditions and residents are always in flux.
To mention but one example, global warming alone might mean that
to achieve anything approaching ecological stability, Yellowstone National Park would have to travel northwards at a rate of about three
kilometers per year. Posing the issue in terms of a mobile park
presents nicely the management challenges that must accompany realization of hopes to preserve biodiversity. The natural systems resist
the law-sanctioned boundaries between jurisdictions, between private
and public property holders, and between historically sanctioned entitlements and future needs. Either the law will bend, or nature will
break, and continuation of past patterns means that we will abandon
the ark rather than find a substitute for it.
E.

Wrong Model #5: Parcel-by-ParcelEvaluation

In yesterday's world, real property was close to a fungible commodity, taking into account the obvious differences of location and
configuration that could be differentiated readily in the open market.
The "new ecology" of which Professor Meyer speaks adds layers of
complexity to this world, distinguishing properties further on grounds
of ecological function, location, and service. There is bad news and
good news in this elevated account. The bad news is that a land acqui11. Compare id. at ch. 4 with SETrING PRIORrrIES, supra note 2, at 10.
12. WORSTER, supra note 10, at ch. 5.
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sition strategy that must evaluate regional and even global 13 realities
is surely a more challenging enterprise than trying to decide between
parcel A or parcel B within the boundaries of the Mount Rainier National Park. Yet, decisionmakers hardly can turn a blind eye to the
empirical knowledge of the day; the good news is that they enjoy techniques (such as the extraordinary Geographical Information Systems) 14 that permit the assimilation and presentation of knowledge in
ways undreamed of a few short years ago. So, too, there are regularities in the ecological systems of which Professor Meyer speaks and
pockets of opportunity buried in the complexities. Those in the business of acquiring land for conservation purposes have been helped,
not hurt, by the explosion of information on corridors, connections,
pathways, and greenways. 15 Here is a chance to repair and protect
natural systems with strategic and sporadic intervention, which is the
immediate foreseeable future for government conservation land
purchases. Parcels of strategic significance certainly exist, but they
can only be seen by stepping back and looking at the bigger pictures
of context, of region, and of ecological service.
CONCLUSION

The world described by Professor Meyer has made a shambles
out of what used to be tried-and-true stable and static legal conservation techniques. The systems of change she describes require a flexible and adaptive legal response. It is time to redesign the ark, equip it
for a rough voyage, and make it ready for contingencies that now
tease the limits of our recognition.

13. Cf. id. at 185 n.1 ("If USFWS were instructed by Congress to 'maximize the preservation of biological diversity' with its acquisition funds, the agency conceivably might be tempted
to make strategic purchases of land in Latin America or elsewhere outside of North America.").
14. See id. at ch. 5.
15. See id. at ch. 5. See also ECOLOGY OF GREENWAYS (Daniel S. Smith & Paul C.

Hellmund eds., 1993); THE ECOLOGY OF
(S.T.A. Pickett & P.S. White eds., 1985).
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